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DON'T BUY ... RENT! 
MARYlAND LAW PROVIDES LIMITLESS INSURANCE FOR 
TENANTS AGAINST CRIMINAL ACTIVIlY AFTER 
HEMMINGS v. PELHAM WOODl 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Tragic cases may have tragic consequences when sympathy 
for a plaintiff interferes with a court's ability to analyze the 
facts and apply the law. Sympathy for the victim of a tragedy 
should not serve as a substitute for evidence of duty, culpabil-
ity, and proximate cause.2 
- Former Judge Howard S. Chasanow, 
Court of Appeals of Maryland 
Howard Hemmings was fatally shot in his own apartment on June 
13, 1998.3 About an hour after midnight, an unidentified intruder 
forcibly entered his Pelham Wood apartment, in Baltimore County, 
Maryland, where he resided with his wife.4 The intruder entered the 
apartment through a sliding glass door in the back of the apartment 
building. 5 Once inside the apartment, the intruder shot Howard 
twice in the abdomen.6 Although he was able to call "911," Howard 
died from the gunshot wounds later that morning. 7 
Regrettably, senseless violence occurs in our society on a daily basis.8 
The statistical data on crime committed in the State of Maryland is 
staggering.9 In 2001, Maryland reported 42,088 violent crimes. lO 
1. Hemmings v. Pelham Wood Ltd. Liab. Ltd. P'ship, 375 Md. 522, 826 A.2d 
443 (2003) [hereinafter Hemmings II]. 
2. Matthews v. Amberwood Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 351 Md. 544, 584, 719 A.2d 
119,138 (1998) (Chasanow,J., dissenting). 
3. City/County Digest: Hillendale Man Is Victim of Fatal Shooting, BALT. SUN, June 
16, 1998, at 3B. 
4. Hemmings v. Pelham Wood Ltd. Liab. Ltd. P'ship, 144 Md. App. 311, 314, 
797 A.2d 851, 853 (2002) [hereinafter Hemmings I], rev'd, 375 Md. 522, 
826 A.2d 443 (2003). 
5. Id. 
6. Hemmings II, 375 Md. at 528,826 A.2d at 447. 
7. Hemmings I, 144 Md. App. at 314, 797 A.2d at 853. 
8. The United States Department of Justice reported 5,341,410 crimes of vio-
lence in 2002. See United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, Criminal Victimization in the United States, 2002 Statistical Tables, tbl. 
1, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cVlls02.pdf (Dec. 2003). 
9. See United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Reported 
Crime in Maryland, at http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/dataonline/Search/ 
Crime/State/RunCrimeStatebyState.cfm (last modified Apr. 14,2003) (se-
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Four hundred and forty-six of those crimes were murder and non-
negligent manslaughterY 
When violence touches our lives, our instinct is to search for some-
one to blame.12 A criminal who perpetrates a crime should be held 
accountable and deserves punishment for his violent actions. 13 In our 
overly litigious society, however, it is common for victims and their 
attorneys to believe that there may be someone else at fault for serious 
injuries resulting from a criminal's violent actions. 14 Victims and their 
lect the "Maryland" option to access this report, which provides data on the 
increasing rate of violent crime in Maryland from 1960-2001). 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. See Lawrence M. Solan, Symposium: Responsibility and Blame: Psychological and 
Legal Perspectives: Cognitive Foundations of the Impulse to Blame, 68· BROOK. L. 
REv. 1003, 1003-04 (2003). Sometimes a person thinks: "Something bad 
happened because someone did (didn't do) something. (That person 
should have known better.) I don't want things like this to happen. When 
I think about the bad thing that happened, I also think about the fact that 
this person did something to make it happen." Id. at 1009. See generally 
Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CAL. L. REv. 257, 257 (1987). Kadish 
stated that: 
Id. 
In both criminal law and everyday moral judgments the concept of 
excuse plays a crucial role. This is because the practice of blaming 
is intrinsically selective .... Excuse is one of those central concepts 
that serve to draw the line between the blameworthy and the 
blameless and so make a blaming system possible. 
13. The Annotated Code of Maryland states that "[a] person who commits a 
murder in the first degree is guilty of a felony and on conviction shall be 
sentenced to: (i) death; (ii) imprisonment for life without the possibility of 
parole; or (iii) imprisonment for life." See MD. CODE ANN., CRlM. LAw § 2-
201(b)(1) (2002). 
14. The extension of tort law and the shifting of fault began in the 1960s. See 
generally Anthony J. Sebok, The Fall and Rise of Blame in American Tort Law, 68 
BROOK. L. REv. 1031, 1033-35 (2003). Sebok states: 
[T]ort law did not really exhibit pro-plaintiff tendencies until 
about 1960. The litany of changes are well known. Courts and leg-
islatures abolished immunities for charities, governments and fam-
ily members. They eliminated auto-guest statutes and guest 
doctrines. Tort law dissolved the special rules of liability for land-
owners, sometimes even with regard to trespassers. In medical mal-
practice, the elimination of the locality rule and the emergence of 
patient-oriented informed consent made it easier for plaintiffs to 
overcome physician defenses. Courts recognized new affirmative 
duties on the part of building owners, therapists and others to pre-
vent injuries to third parties. Bars and liquor stores acquired the 
obligation to prevent injuries caused by drunk driving, as did, on 
occasion, social hosts. The expansion and codification of manufac-
turers' obligations to consumers, which existed since the early part 
of the twentieth century, catalyzed the emerging doctrine of strict 
products liability. The emergence of negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress under the bystander rule and intentional infliction 
of emotional distress created entirely new forms of civil wrong. 
Comparative fault replaced the defense of contributory negligence, 
and many courts merged the defense of assumption of risk into 
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families often ask whether an injury or murder could have been pre-
vented, and who could have prevented it.ls 
It is a long-standing principle of Maryland law that, except for the 
limited circumstances in which the relationship between the parties 
creates a special duty, crime victims may not hold third parties respon-
sible.16 This was also true of landlord-tenant relations. Yet, reversing 
this long-standing precedent and joining a national trend towards 
landlord liability, the Court of Appeals of Maryland recently held that 
there may be someone other than the criminal who bears the respon-
sibility for the incident described above: the landlord of the apart-
ment complex in which Howard Hemmings livedP 
In Hemmings v. Pelham Wood Ltd. Liability Ltd. Partnership (Hem-
mings 11),18 a four-to-three decision by the court of appeals, the re-
sponsibilities of a landlord were significantly broadened. 19 
Specifically, the court held that a landlord can be liable under a negli-
gence theory for the criminal acts of a third party occurring within the 
leased premises.20 The majority held a landlord must act to prevent 
violence perpetrated on a tenant, in the tenant's own apartment, by 
criminals unknown to the landlord.21 
This comment explores the court's far-reaching decision in light of 
the increasing trend in Maryland to impose liability on landlords. Sec-
tion II explores the historical development of Maryland common law 
regarding landlords' duties toward their tenants. Section III com-
Id. 
comparative fault. Courts and legislatures relaxed the rules of cau-
sation as well, first with the introduction of alternative liability, 
then with the expansion of the substantial factor test through the 
introduction of concepts like market-share liability and loss of 
chance. As Gary Schwartz famously commented, until the early 
1980s, the modern cases added to case books were "almost all tri-
umphs for the plaintiffs; the collection of these cases could be re-
ferred to as 'plaintiffs' greatest hits.'" One popular explanation for 
the rise of the plaintiff in the 1960s is that the shift of the balance 
of power away from defendants and toward victims was an exten-
sion of the basic concept of negligence that had developed in 
American law in the nineteenth century. 
15. See generally Solan, supra note 12, at 1009. 
16. See, e.g., Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 166, 359 A.2d 548, 552 (1976); 
Moore v. Jimel, Inc., 147 Md. App. 336, 346,809 A.2d 10, 15 (2002). In 
Maryland, "a private person is under no special duty to protect another 
from criminal acts by a third person." Moare, 147 Md. App. at 346,809 A.2d 
at 15. 
17. See Hemmings II, 375 Md. at 543, 826 A.2d at 455 (holding that a landlord 
may be held liable for the criminal acts of third parties perpetrated on a 
tenant within the tenant's own apartment). 
18. 375 Md. 522, 826 A.2d 443. 
19. See id. at 543,826 A.2d at 455 (expanding a landlord's duty to use reasona-
ble care to prevent harm to his tenants beyond the common areas of the 
complex). 
20. See id. 
21. Id. 
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pares the Court of Appeals of Maryland's decision in Hemmings II to 
judicial decisions in numerous states regarding the same issue. Sec-
tion III also argues that Maryland should have followed the rationale 
of other states by refusing to extend to landlords the duty to protect 
tenants from the criminal acts of third parties. Section IV explains the 
broader social and economic ramifications of the Hemmings II deci-
sion and its probable effect on landlords and tenants alike. Section V 
concludes this comment by rejecting the notion that landlords should 
be the ultimate insurance policy for tenants. This section further op-
poses the court's continued movement to decrease individual respon-
sibility and impose overbroad duties absent statutes or certain special 
relationships. In the Hemmings II decision, a split court of appeals 
established yet another legal avenue for litigious individuals to shift 
moral blame to third parties when tragedy occurs.22 
II. HISTORICAL ANAYLSIS OF MARYLAND CASE LAW REGARD-
ING THE DUTIES OF LANDLORDS 
A. The Easy Days Gone By 
In the past it was relatively simple for attorneys to advise landlord 
clients regarding the Maryland law: no duty was owed to tenants once 
the owner parted with control of the leased premises.23 For over one 
hundred years, Maryland law was well settled that the tenant had the 
burden of maintaining the premises in the absence of an agreement 
22. 
23. 
See generally Hemmings II, 375 Md. 522, 826 A.2d 443; Sebok, supra note 14, 
at lO33-35 (discussing the shift of blame in American tort law). 
See Marshall v. Price, 162 Md. 687, 689, 161 A. 172, 172 (1932) (holding 
that the landlord was not liable for injuries to a guest of a tenant who fell 
into a pit). In Marshall, the Court of Appeals of Maryland stated that" [t] he 
law is well settled that, when the owner has parted with his control, the 
tenant has the burden of the proper keeping of the premises, in the ab-
sence of an agreement to the contrary; and for any nuisance created by the 
tenant the landlord is not responsible." [d. (citations omitted). According 
to earlier notions of landlord-tenant law, the tenant took the leased prop-
erty as he found it, and the landlord was not responsible for any defect on 
the property or injury sustained by the tenant while on the property. See, 
e.g., Smith v. State ex rel. Walsh, 92 Md. 518, 529-30, 48 A. 92, 93 (1901). 
For example, if the property was to fall down, the landlord was under no 
obligation to repair it, unless expressly stated by contract; however, the ten-
ant was still under an obligation to pay rent. [d. As one commentator elo-
quently stated: 
It all made sense back in those days with the landlord off on the 
hunt or drinking port in the quiet of the evening, and the tenant 
asking only to be left alone to tend his fences and to shear his 
sheep. . .. The model landlord was the one who did the least. The 
tenant, in turn, was expected to run the farm, to be the omnicom-
petent man fully prepared to see to his own shelter, heat and light. 
Thomas M. Quinn & Earl Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical 
Evaluation of the Past with Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REv. 225, 
231 (1970). 
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to the contrary.24 The landlord's obligation extended only as far as 
turning over possession of the property to the tenant and an agree-
ment to leave that tenant in peaceful possession.25 
Maryland cases repeated language to that effect.26 Specifically, the 
cases held that mere ownership of land or buildings did not render 
the owner liable for injuries sustained by tenants or invitees rightfully 
on the premises because the owner was not considered an insurer of 
such persons.27 This doctrinal theory was based on the notion that 
the lease was a conveyance of interest in the property,28 and not a 
contractual undertaking of the landlord.29 
B. Common Areas Must Be Maintained to Protect Tenants from Personal 
Injury 
Over the years, landlords were given more responsibility under 
leases,3o and the Court of Appeals of Maryland modified the common 
law according to the changing nature of the tenant.31 Based on such 
changes, landlords owed tenants the duty to exercise ordinary care to 
render the premises reasonably safe, regardless of an express con-
tract.32 A landlord's duty was ordinary care and diligence to maintain 
24. See, e.g., Marshal~ 162 Md. at 689,161 A. at 172; Millerv. Fisher, 111 Md. 91, 
94, 73 A. 891, 892 (1909); Smith, 92 Md. at 529-30, 48 A. at 93; Owings v. 
Jones, 9 Md. 108, 108-09 (1856). 
25. Quinn & Phillips, supra note 23, at 227 n.2. 
26. See, e.g., Marshall, 162 Md. at 689, 161 A. at 172; Miller, III Md. at 94, 73 A. 
at 892. 
27. See Marshall, 162 Md. at 689,161 A. at 172; Miller, 111 Md. at 94,73 A. at 
892. 
28. Quinn & Phillips, supra note 23, at.228 n.4. 
29. See id. at 229 n.5 (explaining that the "duty of the landlord was imposed by 
the law through the device of an implied covenant"). 
30. See Miriam J. Haines, Landlords or Tenants: Who Bears the Costs of Crime?, 2 
CARDozo L. REv. 299, 301-03 (1981) (explaining the historical develop-
ment of landlord-tenant common law throughout the United States). Spe-
cifically, Haines stated that: 
During the Industrial Revolution, with the growing urbanization of 
the population, the agricultural lease declined in importance. 
Structures on the leased land became increasingly significant in the 
lease transaction. Specific covenants were inserted in leases appor-
tioning the responsibility between, and protecting the rights of, 
landlord and tenant. Thus, "the typical lease began to look more 
like a contract than a deed of real estate," raising anew the ques-
tion of how it should be treated. 
[d. at 303. 
31. See Landay v. Cohn, 220 Md. 24, 27-28, 150 A.2d 739, 741 (1959) (discuss-
ing the duty of a landlord to his tenant in Maryland in 1959). 
32. See id., at 27, 150 A.2d at 740 (stating that "[w]here a landlord leases sepa-
rate portions of a property to different tenants and reserves under his con-
trol halls, stairways or other parts of the property for use in common by all 
the tenants, he must use ordinary care and diligence to maintain the re-
tained parts in reasonably safe condition"). The court in Landay found that 
"[t]he duty stems from the responsibility engendered in the landlord by his 
having extended an invitation, express or implied, to use the portions of 
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the common areas.33 Ordinary care and diligence did not include 
protecting tenants from criminal acts of third parties; rather, it was 
ordinary care that would ensure the property, buildings, and land 
were safe for the tenants in their intended use.34 
Beginning in the 1960s, the Court of Appeals of Maryland furthered 
its expansion of the common law doctrine regarding landlords' duties 
towards tenants.35 For example, in Langley Park APo:rtments v. Lund,36 
the court extended the landlord's general duty to maintain common 
areas to include the removal of snow and ice when the landlord was 
aware or should have been aware of the dangerous condition.37 The 
court, however, was reluctant to make landlords "insurers" of tenants' 
safety.38 In Langley Park Apartments, the court of appeals carefully 
stated, "We do not mean to suggest that the mere fact that snow has 
accumulated will in and of itself result in liability upon the landlord, 
for that would make him virtually an insurer."39 The court implicitly 
recognized that to place landlords in the position of ultimate insurer 
of tenants' safety would be an enormous burden for landlords, while 
taking away all accountability from tenants for their own action or in-
action.40 In this decision, the court of appeals expressly rejected the 
role of landlord as an insurerY 
C. Security Gates and Locked Doors Become Necessary to Keep Criminals 
from Entering Common Areas 
Twelve years after the decision in Langley Park Apartments, the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland answered three certified questions from the 
United States District Court for the District of Maryland.42 In Scott v. 
Watson,43 the court faced the controversial question of whether a land-
lord had a duty to protect tenants "from the criminal acts of third 
parties committed in common areas within the landlord's con-
the property retained by him." [d. at 27, 150 A.2d at 741 (citations 
omitted). 
33. Elmar Gardens, Inc. v. Odell, 227 Md. 454, 457, 177 A.2d 263, 265 (1962) 
(citing Long v. Joestiein, 193 Md. 211, 216, 66 A.2d 407, 409 (1949); 
Yaniger v. Calvert Bldg. & Constr. Co., 183 Md. 285, 288, 37 A.2d 263, 264 
(1944». 
34. See id. 
35. See generally Langley Park Apartments v. Lund, 234 Md. 402, 407-10, 199 
A.2d 620, 623-24 (1964). 
36. 234 Md. 402, 199 A.2d 620 (1964). 
37. [d. at 410, 199 A.2d at 624. 
38. [d. at 409-10, 199 A.2d at 624. 
39. [d. 
40. See generally id. 
41. See id. 
42. See Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 161-62,359 A.2d 548,550 (1976). 
43. 278 Md. 160, 359 A.2d 548 (1976). 
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trol .... "44 The court came to two distinct conclusions regarding the 
landlord's duty in Scott.45 
First, the court answered the question of whether a landlord had a 
special duty to protect tenants from the criminal acts of third parties 
committed in common areas within the landlord's contro1.46 The 
court declined to impose a special duty "upon the landlord to protect 
his tenants against crimes perpetrated by third parties on the land-
lord's premises."47 The court reasoned that such a "general rule is a 
subsidiary of the broader rule that a private person is under no special 
duty to protect another from criminal acts by a third person, in the 
absence of statutes, or of a special relationship."48 The Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland, therefore, "decline[d] to impose a special duty on 
a landlord to protect his tenants from criminal activity since to do so 
would place him perilously close to the position of insurer of his te-
nants' safety."49 Such language, repeated almost verbatim from ear-
lier cases, 50 suggests that the court was steadfast in its holding that a 
landlord should not be responsible for his tenants' safety. 51 
Second, the Scott court was presented with the issue of whether a 
general duty would "be imposed if the landlord had knowledge of in-
creasing criminal activity on the premises."52 The court held that "[i]f 
the landlord knows, or should know, of criminal activity against per-
sons or property in the common areas, he then has a duty to take 
reasonable measures, in view of the existing circumstances, to elimi-
nate the conditions contributing to the criminal activity."53 The court 
explained that the "duty arises primarily from criminal activities ex-
isting on the landlord's premises, and not from knowledge of general 
criminal activities in the neighborhood."54 
Although the court noted that finding a landlord has breached his 
duty to protect tenants from the criminal activities of third parties 
does not alone overcome the hurdle of causation,55 Scott clearly set the 
precedent for expansion of landlord liability. 56 The court attempted 
to limit when a landlord may be liable for the criminal acts of another; 
44. [d. at 161-62, 359 A.2d at 550. 
45. See id. at 167, 169, 359 A.2d at 553-54. 
46. [d. at 166, 359 A.2d at 552. 
47. [d. 
48. [d. (summarizing the general principle set forth in the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965)). 
49. [d. at 167, 359 A.2d at 553. 
50. See, e.g., Langley Park Apartments, 234 Md. at 410, 199 A.2d at 624. 
51. Scott, 278 Md. at 167, 359 A.2d at 553. 
52. [d. at 162, 359 A.2d at 550. 
53. [d. at 169, 359 A.2d at 554. 
54. [d. 
55. [d. at 171, 359 A.2d at 555 (stating that "the determination of proximate 
cause is subject to considerations of fairness and social policy as well as 
mere causation"). 
56. See id. at 169, 359 A.2d at 554. 
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however, the limitation was murky at best.57 Accordingly, landlords 
became targets for negligence cases of all kinds.58 
D. Dogs Days for Landlords 
An example of the wave of new negligence cases occurred in 1998, 
when the court of appeals heard two similar cases involving a land-
lord's duty to his tenants in the same term. 59 Coincidentally, both 
cases involved injuries inflicted by canines present on the leased 
premises.60 More importantly, both holdings stretched Maryland's 
landlord liability in an unexpected manner. 
In Shields v. Wagman, 61 two individuals sustained injuries when at-
tacked by a pit bull owned by a tenant of a strip mal1.62 The court 
held that the landlord of the commercial property could be held lia-
ble for injuries sustained in the common area caused by a dog kept on 
the leased premises.63 Specifically, the court held that because "the 
landlord had knowledge of the potential danger and the ability to rid 
the premises of that danger by refusing to re-Iet the premise," the 
landlord could be held liable.64 The holding in Shields was foresee-
able considering that the rationale of the court was similar to previous 
landlord liability cases regarding common areas, specifically Scott.65 
The Shields court reasoned that because the landlord had control over 
the common area of the property and knowledge of the viciousness of 
the dog, the landlord could be held liable for the injuries sustained.66 
In the second "canine" case, Matthews v. Amberwood Associates Ltd. 
Partnership,67 a sixteen-month-old child was attacked and killed by a pit 
bull owned by a tenant of an apartment complex.68 In a four-to-three 
57. See id. 
58. See id. 
59. See Shields v. Wagman, 350 Md. 666, 714 A.2d 881 (1998); Matthews v. 
Amberwood Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 351 Md. 544, 719 A.2d 119 (1998), two 
cases heard in the September Term, 1997, considering a landlord's duty 
when a tenant's dog bites someone on his premises. 
60. Shields, 350 Md. at 668-69, 714 A.2d at 882; Matthews, 351 Md. at 548, 719 
A.2d at 120. 
61. 350 Md. 666, 714 A.2d 881. 
62. Id. at 669, 714 A.2d at 882. 
63. Id. at 668-69, 714 A.2d at 882. 
64. [d. at 669, 714 A.2d at 882. 
65. See Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 165-69, 359 A.2d 548, 552-54 (1976); see also 
Shields, 350 Md. at 673-77,714 A.2d at 884-86. The court in Shields discussed 
Maryland cases regarding common areas and specifically stated: 
l W] here a landlord leases separate portions of his property to dif-
ferent tenants and reserves under his control the passageways and 
stairways, and other parts of the property for the common use of all 
the tenants[,] he must then exercise ordinary care and diligence to 
maintain the retained portions in a reasonably safe condition. 
[d. at 673-74,714 A.2d at 884 (citations omitted). 
66. [d. at 690-91, 714 A.2d at 892-93. 
67. 351 Md. 544, 719 A.2d 119 (1997). 
68. [d. at 548-51, 719 A.2d at 120-22. 
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decision, the majority held that the landlord owed a duty of care to 
visitors when the landlord had knowledge of the violent animal within 
the tenant's apartment and the ability to take reasonable steps to pro-
tect against the animal's attack.69 The court reasoned that although 
the attack occurred within the leased premise of a residential build-
ing-within the tenant's apartment-the landlord could have taken 
steps to retake possession of the apartment.70 
The Matthews court found that because "[t]he landlord retained 
control over the presence of a dog in the leased premises by virtue of 
the 'no pets' clause in the lease," the landlord could have brought a 
breach of lease action to evict the tenant. 71 The court further stated 
that prior to bringing such an action, the landlord should have in-
formed the tenant that harboring the pit bull was a violation of the 
lease upon receiving notice of the presence of a canine.72 Naively, the 
court believed that if the landlord had taken such steps, the tenant 
would have removed the canine from the leased premise.73 But be-
cause the landlord took no action, the court found that the landlord 
was negligent and affirmed the decision of the circuit court, awarding 
over five million dollars in damages.74 
Comparing Scott and Shields with Matthews, there is an obvious devia-
tion in the holding of Matthews, which usurps the court's previous 
holdings. Specifically, the Matthews court reasoned that a duty exists 
even though the injury occurred within the leased premises,75 in direct 
contrast with the holdings in Scott and Shields, that a landlord may only 
be liable for injuries that occur in common areas. 76 The court at-
tempted to downplay this change, stating that the key is to determine 
if the landlord has control over whether the tenant can remain in the 
69. [d. at 570, 719 A.2d at 131-32. 
70. [d. at 558,719 A.2d at 125-26. The dissent quickly points out that the land-
lord had no ability to repossess the property for numerous reasons. [d. at 
590-91,719 A.2d at 142 (Chasanow,j., dissenting). 
71. [d. at 558, 719 A.2d at 125-26. 
72. [d. at 558, 719 A.2d at 126. 
73. [d. 
74. [d. at 522,583,719 A.2d at 122,138. In Matthews, the jury awarded damages 
as follows: $5,018,750 to Matthews (the mother of the victim) and $562,100 
to the father of victim for the wrongful death of Tevin; $600,000 non-eco-
nomic damages and $4,147.52 compensatory damages to Tevin's estate 
under the survival action; and $1,110,000 to Matthews as damages for inten-
tional "infliction of emotional distress." [d. at 552, 719 A.2d at 122. "The 
court granted the defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict on the intentional infliction of emotional distress count, reduced 
the non-economic damages award in the survival action to $350,000, and 
denied all other motions." [d. at 552, 719 A.2d at 122-23. 
75. [d. at 564-65, 719 A.2d at 129. 
76. See Shields, 350 Md. at 673-77, 714 A.2d at 884-86; Scott, 278 Md. at 165-66, 
359 A.2d at 552. 
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leased premise.77 This change, however, is a drastic shift in reasoning 
which the court casually adopts. 
E. Landlords, Policemen-Same Thing? 
Those familiar with the holdings of the court in Matthews, Shields, 
and Scott, were likely not su~rised by the headline appearing in The 
Daily Record onJune 17, 2003. 8 The headline read: "Landlord May Be 
Liable for Murder in Apartment."79 The holding in Hemmings II 
raises many questions. How can a landlord protect his or her tenants 
from murders perpetrated by third parties within the tenants' own 
apartments? Are landlords now law enforcement agents? Are land-
lords insurers of safety? Not only is the holding far-reaching, the ma-
jority does what the Court of Appeals of Maryland stated many times 
that it refrained from doing: it turns landlords into the ultimate insur-
ers of tenants' safety. 
1. The Facts of Hemmings II and the Midnight Burglar 
Howard Hemmings and his wife, Suzette, resided on Lynfair Court 
in a two-bedroom apartment unit located on the second floor just 
above the ground level apartment.80 The second-floor apartment sat 
adjacent to the woods.81 "As with all of the apartments in the develop-
ment, unit A-2 was equipped with deadbolt locks and 'Charlie-bars,' 
which secured the sliding glass doors of the apartment balconies."82 
In the middle of the night on June 13, 1998, an unidentified person 
entered the apartment through the back sliding glass door and fatally 
shot Howard.83 He died shortly thereafter.84 
The intruder was likely not someone Howard and Suzette Hem-
mings knew. Suzette Hemmings' complaint stated that the intruder 
entered the apartment by forcing open the locked sliding glass door 
located on the second floor balcony at the back of the building.85 Evi-
dence obtained through subsequent on-scene investigation was consis-
tent with a forced entry.86 
77. Matthews, 351 Md. at 565,719 A.2d at 129. The majority stated that "[t]he 
'control' factor upon which the Court relied in Shields was not the tradi-
tional landlord control over common areas. Rather, as in the instant case, 
it was the landlord's control over the tenant's remaining in the leased 
premises." [d. 
78. See Lawrence Hurley, Landlord May Be Liable for Murder in Apartment, DAILY 
RECORD, June 17, 2003, at lB. 
79. [d. 
80. Hemmings II, 375 Md. at 528, 826 A.2d at 446. 
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2. The Majority's Reasoning in Hemmings II 
As previously mentioned, the majority held that the landlord may 
be liable for the tragic death of Howard Hemmings.87 Similar to the 
holdings in Matthews, where the injuries were tragic, the court found a 
reason to create an exception to the once well-established rule that 
the landlord is not the insurer of tenants' safety.88 In Hemmings II, 
the court's caveat is similar to the one in Matthews. The majority 
stated that "a landlord is not necessarily immune from liability be-
cause a tenant's injury occurred within' the leased premises."89 
Rather, a landlord's duty to use reasonable care for the tenant's safety 
within the common areas also applies to injuries suffered from crimi-
nal acts within the leased premises.90 A landlord's duty stems from 
the fact that he is in a better position to control the security measures 
and from the fact that he may have knowledge that criminal activity 
on the premises has created a dangerous condition.91 Accordingly, 
the landlord must take reasonable measures to eliminate the criminal 
activity.92 
The Hemmings II court held that" [0] nce a landlord takes reasona-
ble security measures to eliminate conditions that contribute to crimi-
nal activity on the premises, all of its duties ... have not been fulfilled 
necessarily."93 Instead, "a landlord has a continuing obligation to 
properly carry out the security measures it provides."94 This means a 
landlord must "maintain and regularly inspect the devices imple-
mented to deter criminal activity."95 For example, in Hemmings II, 
the landlord had implemented several security devices.96 The court 
held, however, that if the landlord failed to adequately maintain these 
security measures, the landlord may have breached its duties towards 
its tenants and Howard Hemmings.97 
87. See supra text accompanying notes 18-21. 
88. Hemmings II, 375 Md. at 542, 826 A.2d at 455. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 543, 826 A.2d at 455. 
91. Id. at 542-43, 826 A.2d at 455. 
92. Id. at 543-44, 826 A.2d at 455-56. 
93. Hemmings II, 375 Md. at 546, 826 A.2d at 457. But see infra Part IV.C. 
94. Hemmings II, 375 Md. at 546, 826 A.2d at 457. 
95. Id. at 547, 826 A.2d at 458. 
96. Specifically, there was "exterior lighting around the property" and the 
apartment had "a regular door lock on its front door as well as a dead bolt 
door lock." Id. at 528,826 A.2d at 446. Additionally, "[f]or the apartments 
with patio doors, like the Hemmings', the Landlord provided ... 'a charlie 
bar,' a horizontally mounted bar securing the sliding glass door." Id. at 
528, 826 A.2d at 446-47. '''[T]he [apartment] windows ha[d] locks on 
them,' and there was 'interior lighting in the common area hallways.'" Id. 
Ground level apartments had alarm systems, which would generate a 
"strong and loud noise" if activated. Id. at 528, 826 A.2d at 447. 
97. Id. at 547-48, 826 A.2d at 458. 
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3. Judge Raker's Dissenting Opinion 
Judge Raker's dissent, which was joined by Judge Cathell and Judge 
Harrell, addressed the flaws in the majority's holding. Judge Raker 
stated unequivocally that the only way in which the majority reached 
the "desired result [was] to cobble together the line of cases in Mary-
land imposing a duty for liability for physical harm which occurred in 
the common areas with the line of cases finding liability for demised 
premise damage resulting from a cause originating in the common 
area."98 Judge Raker reiterated that "[a] landlord is not the insurerof 
the safety of persons within the demised premises, or for that matter, 
in the common areas of 'the property."99 Most importantly, she ac-
knowledged that the majority's holding "is a novel theory, unsup-
ported by any authority or case law in the country."lOO It is 
unsupported precisely because of its unreasonableness in tort theory 
and property law, and because of its undeniably broad consequences 
for landlords and tenants alike. 101 
III. A COMPARISON VIEW: OTHER STATES EXPRESSLY REFUSE 
TO EXPAND THE LIABILI1Y OF LANDLORDS 
As discussed above, the extension of landlord liability for injuries 
sustained by the criminal acts of others is a relatively novel concept, 
not only in Maryland, but in other jurisdictions. The first decisive case 
regarding the matter was the 1970 decision of Kline v. 1500 Massachu-
setts Avenue Apartment Corp.102 In Kline, a tenant was injured when she 
was attacked and robbed in the common area of her apartment com-
plex. 103 Finding that the landlord could be held liable for criminal 
attacks sustained by tenants in the common areas, the court stated 
that although "[t]he landlord is no insurer of his tenants' safety ... he 
certainly is no bystander."104 The Kline court held that it is not unwar-
ranted "to place upon the landlord a duty to take those steps which 
98. Hemmings II, 375 Md. at 556-57, 826 A.2d at 463 (Raker, j., dissenting). 
Judge Raker wrote: 
The entire basis of the majority opinion rests upon inadequate 
lighting in the rear of the apartment building. The majority holds 
that because the landlord provided exterior lighting at Pelham 
Wood as a security measure intended to deter criminal activity, it 
had a duty to adequately maintain that lighting .... From this duty 
to maintain adequate lighting in the 'common area, the majority 
makes the unjustified leap in logic that somehow the landlord is 
then responsible for violent criminal activity that occurred within 
the demised premises and not within the common area. 
Id. at 551,826 A.2d at 460 (Raker,j., dissenting). 
99. Id. at 552, 826 A.2d at 461 (Raker, j., dissenting). 
100. Id. at 557, 826 A.2d at 463 (Raker, j., dissenting). 
101. See infra Parts III-N. 
102. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
103. Id. at 478. 
104. Id. at 481. 
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are within his power to minimize the predictable risk to his te-
nants."105 In holding the landlord owed that duty to his tenants, the 
court found that the following circumstances had occurred: the land-
lord had "notice of repeated criminal assaults and robberies, ha[d] 
notice that the crimes occurred in the portion of the premises exclu-
sively within his control, ha[d] every reason to expect like crimes to 
happen again, and ha[d] the exclusive power to take preventive 
action."106 
Although jurisdictions vary in their approach to the issue, many 
states have refused to adopt the holding in Kline, imposing liability on 
landlords in certain cases involving criminal acts of third parties oc-
curring within the leased premises. 107 In fact, many states have ad-
dressed situations almost identical to Hemmings 11,108 yet declined to 
extend landlord liability as far as the Court of Appeals of Maryland. 109 
A. Failure of the Landlord to Secure Doors or Windows 
The following states have refused to expand landlord liability in ac-
tions involving crimes against the person occurring within the tenant's 
apartment. Specifically, the following cases involve a third party crimi-
nal entering the victim's apartment, allegedly due to the landlord's 
failure to secure the doors or windows of the residential apartment 
building. 
105. [d. 
106. [d. See also Haines, supra note 30, at 314-22 (discussing the Kline decision 
and landlords' developing duty to protect tenants from foreseeable crimi-
nal acts). 
107. See discussion infra Part III.A-B. 
108. In Hemmings II, the allegations of negligence included the landlord's fail-
ure to maintain adequate lighting and secure the locks of the sliding glass 
door. See Hemmings II, 375 Md. 522, 532, 826 A.2d 443, 449. Other states 
that have addressed similar cases include Arkansas, Illinois, Massachusetts, 
New York, Ohio, South Carolina, and Wisconsin. See discussion infra Part 
III.A-B. 
109. According to one critic: 
The recent cases are not unanimous; and there are recent deci-
sions which follow the common law majority rule and reject the 
idea of imposing liability on the landlord for the wrongful acts of 
third parties. A number of rationales are put forth in support of 
majority rule including, among others, (i) the idea that the inten-
tional criminal act of a third person is a superseding cause of harm 
to the tenant, (ii) the difficulty of determining the foreseeability of 
the criminal act, and (iii) judicial reluctance to modifY traditional 
landlord-tenant concepts. 
DAVID S. HILL, LANDLORD AND TENANT LAw IN A NUTSHELL 79 (West Pub-
lishing Co. 1986) (1979). See also discussion infra Part IV. 
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1. Illinois 
In Martin v. Usher, llO a tenant brought an action against her land-
lord for damages, charging that she was injured in her apartment as a 
result of being shot by an intruder who robbed and attempted to rape 
her. lll The Illinois court held there was no duty on behalf of the 
landlord to protect the tenant from the criminal acts of a third 
party.112 The court expressly refused to impose a legal duty on the 
landlord.113 
2. Massachusetts 
In Choy v. First Columbia Management, Inc.,114 a tenant brought an 
action against her former landlord asserting claims of negligence and 
breach of contract arising from her brutal beating and rape that oc-
curred in her apartment.1l5 The tenant alleged "that locks on the 
doors to the building were constantly broken or unlocked providing 
easy access to the intruders."1l6 The United States District Court for 
the District of Massachusetts, applying Massachusetts law, held that 
the causal connection between the asserted negligence and the injury 
was too attenuated to allow a jury to find more likely than not that the 
assailant gained access to the complex in this manner. 117 
1l0. 371 N.E.2d 69 (Ill. App: Ct. 1977). 
lli. [d. at 70. 
112. [d. 
113. [d. (quoting Smith v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 344 N.E.2d 536, 540 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1976)}. Specifically, the Illinois court adhered to the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts that the court characterized as setting forth: 
[Under § 315] there is no duty to control the conduct of a third 
person to such a degree as to prevent him from causing physical 
harm to another, unless a special relationship exists between the 
actor and the other. Sections 314 and 320 of the Restatement list 
certain special relationships, such as common carrier-passenger, 
business invitor-invitee and innkeeper-guest. In Illinois the land-
lord-tenant relationship has not been considered a special relation-
ship which could create the existence of a duty. 
[d. (citations omitted); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314, 
315,320 (1965). 
114. 676 F. Supp. 28 (D. Mass. 1987). 
115. [d. at 29. 
116. [d. 
117. [d. While the court declined to answer the question of whether the land-
lord owes a duty to the tenant, it found that "the plaintiff ha[d] produced 
no evidence from which ajury could rationally decide that the defendants' 
negligence caused the plaintiff's injuries." [d. at 29-30. The court recog-
nized that " [c]ausation is an essential element of the plaintiff's case in an 
action for negligence. Proof that the defendant breached a duty owed to 
plaintiff is not enough to establish liability. To recover for her injuries, the 
plaintiff must prove a causal connection between the defendant's negli-
gence and plaintiff's harm." [d. at 30 (citing Canon v. Sears, Roebuck & 
Co., 374 N.E.2d 582,584 (Mass. 1978}). 
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3. New York 
Pagan v. Hampton Houses, Inc. ll8 involved the tragic occurrence of 
a tenant found murdered in her apartmentY9 In Pagan, reports indi-
cated that violence had occurred within the building, that a security 
guard was not always present, and that locks to various entrances were 
broken. 120 The New York court, however, held that the "plaintiff 
ha[d] failed to come forward with evidence that negligence, if any, on 
the part of the landlord ... was the proximate cause of the [tenant]' s 
injuries and death."121 
In Perry v. New York City Housing Authority,122 another New York case, 
a tenant's ex-boyfriend attacked her with a knife after forcibly enter-
ing her apartment.123 The tenant brought an action against the land-
lord alleging that the landlord's negligent failure to provide adequate 
locks resulted in her injuries.124 The court noted that "with regard to 
the allegation that the outside doors to the building were unlocked, 
the [tenant] offers no evidence that her assailant took advantage of 
the unlocked doors to enter the building."125 The tenant "raised no 
factual issue as to whether the unlocked doors were a proximate cause 
of her injuries."126 The landlord was entitled to summary 
judgment.127 
4. Ohio 
In Carmichael v. Colonial Square Apartments,128 a tenant who had been 
assaulted in his apartment brought an action against his landlord al-
leging that the landlord's failure in providing adequate security for 
the common areas constituted negligence.129 The court affirmed 
summary judgment for the landlord holding that the landlord had 
only a duty to provide reasonable security to tenants and was "not an 
insurer of the premises against criminal activity."130 Moreover, the 
court held that, "assuming [the landlord] breached a duty to provide 
reasonable security, [the tenant] has failed to present any evidence 
118. 589 N.Y.S.2d 471 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (mem.). 
119. [d. at 472. 
120. [d. 
121. [d. 
122. 635 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (mem.). 




127. [d. at 663. 
128. 528 N.E.2d 585 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987). 
129. [d. at 586. 
130. [d. at 586-87 (quoting Sciascia v. Riverpark Apartments, 444 N.E.2d 40, 42 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1981)). 
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upon which reasonable minds could differ that its failure was the 
proximate cause of his injuries."131 
5. Wisconsin 
In Rowinski v. R.echt-Goldin-Siegl Construction, Inc.,132 a tenant brought 
an action after being raped in her apartment. 133 The tenant alleged 
that the landlords were negligent in failing to provide a locked en-
trance with an intercom system or security personnel. 134 The court, 
while finding the negligence action supportable, rejected the tenant's 
claim based on Wisconsin's safe place statute. 135 The court pointed 
out that "an owner of a public building is liable only for structural 
defects and unsafe conditions associated with the structure."136 The 
court found that" [f] ailure to provide an electronic monitoring system 
at the entranceway to an apartment complex does not constitute a 
structural defect within the meaning of the safe place statute."137 
B. Failure of the Landlord to Repair or Replace Lights 
The following states have held that landlords cannot be held liable 
for damages suffered by the tenant as a result of the criminal acts of a 
third party. Specifically, these cases involve situations in which entry 
into the victim's apartment was allegedly due to improper lighting or 
the failure of the landlord to repair or replace lights. 
1. Arkansas 
In Bartley v. Sweetser,138 a tenant filed an action against her landlords 
for negligence. 139 The tenant alleged that the landlords breached 
their duty of care by failing to implement reasonable security mea-
sures to prevent foreseeable criminal acts. 140 The tenant argued that 
the landlords had, inter alia, failed to provide adequate lighting of the 
common areas. 141 The court held that "a landlord, under Arkansas 
law, is not the insurer of the safety of tenants or others upon the 
131. Id. at 587. 
132. No. 82-1695, 1983 WL 161541, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983) (per curiam). 
133. Id. at *1. 
134. Id. at *2. 
135. Id. See also WIS. STAT. ANN. § 101.11 (West 2004). The safe place statute 
establishes that employers and landlords must provide a safe environment 
for their employees or tenants. Id. § 101.11 (1). The statute applies only to 
unsafe physical conditions of the premises, not to activities conducted on 
premises. See id. § 101.11(1)-(2); see also Korenak v. Curative Workshop 
Adult Rehab. Ctr., 237 N.w.2d 43,47 (Wis. 1976). 
136. Rowinski, 1983 WL 161541, at *2. 
137. Id. 
138. 890 S.W.2d 250 (Ark. 1994). 
139. Id. at 250. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
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premises."142 Thus, the landlord did not owe the tenant a duty to 
protect the tenant from criminal acts.143 
2. South Carolina 
Cramer v. Balcor Property Management, Inc.,144 involved a wrongful 
death action brought by the personal representative of a tenant mur-
dered in her apartment by an intruder.I4s The intruder entered her 
apartment by prying open a sliding glass door. I46 The plaintiff argued 
that the landlord had not maintained sufficient lighting on the prop-
erty.I47 The United States District Court for the District of South Car-
olina, applying South Carolina law, held that the landlord had no 
special duty to protect tenants from the criminal acts of third par-
ties. I48 The court reasoned that even though "a landlord has a duty to 
maintain the common areas of a leased property in a safe condition," 
the rule had "never been applied in South Carolina to anything ex-
cept physical injuries resulting directly from the condition of the prem-
ises themselves."149 
IV. LANDLORDS AS INSURERS: THE LEGAL, SOCIAL, AND ECO-
NOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE HEMMINGS II DECISION 
The decision of the majority in Hemmings II clearly went too far in 
holding that landlords must be insurers against possible criminal activ-
ity.ISO As stated by the court numerous times, there is no general duty 
to protect another person from the criminal acts of a third party ab-
sent a special dUty.ISI Based on obvious public policy reasons, 
142. Id. at 252. 
143. Id. 
144. 848 F. Supp. 1222 (D.S.C. 1994). 
145. Id. at 1223. 
146. Id. at 1223-24. 
147. Id. at 1225. 
148. Id. at 1224 (quoting Cramer v. Ba1cor Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 441 S.E.2d 317, 
319 (S.c. 1994)). 
149. Id. at 1225 (quoting Cooke v. Allstate Mgmt. Corp., 741 F. Supp. 1205, 1211 
(D.S.C. 1990)). The court states that "the Supreme Court of South Caro-
lina has expressly ruled that a landlord has no duty to a tenant to provide 
security in and around a leased premises to protect the tenant from crimi-
nal activity of third parties." Id. 
150. See Hemmings II, 375 Md. at 545, 826 A.2d at 457. 
151. See Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 166, 359 A.2d 548, 552 (1975) (holding 
that "there is no special duty imposed upon the landlord to protect his 
tenants against crimes perpetrated by third parties on the landlord's prem-
ises"); See also W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS, 
§ 56 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing consistent refusal to impose a duty to res-
cue); Haines, supra note 30, at 306-07. Haines stated: 
Courts did impose a duty for third party criminal acts where certain 
recognized "special relationship[s]" were found. These relation-
ships were seen to be of such character that public policy dictated 
that one party should have an obligation to use reasonable care to 
protect the other from third party criminal acts. The relationships 
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"[ c] ourts have generally held ... that it is not fair to impose upon the 
landlord a duty to protect the tenant from criminal activity within the 
demised area."152 The reason for not imposing liability on landlords 
for the criminal acts of others perpetrated on tenants has been sum-
marized as follows: 
Judicial reluctance to tamper with the traditional common 
law concept of the landlord-tenant relationship; the notion 
that the act of a third person in committing an intentional 
tort or crime is a superseding cause of the harm to another 
resulting therefrom; the oftentimes difficult problem of de-
termining foreseeability of criminal acts; the vagueness of 
the standard which the landlord must meet; the economic 
consequences of the imposition of the duty; and the conflict 
with the public policy allocating the duty of protecting citi-
zens from criminal acts to the government rather than the 
private sector.153 
Such policy considerations must be carefully analyzed when changing 
the common law by imposing such an encumbering duty upon land-
lords.154 The majority in Hemmings II, however, failed to address 
these policy considerations in imposing the ultimate duty of insurer 
on landlords in Maryland. 
A. Judicial Reluctance to Tamper with the Traditional Common Law Con-
cept of the Landlord-Tenant Relationship 
As discussed above, under the common law in Marylandl55-and 
throughout the United States-it was well-established that a landlord 
in which such a duty has been imposed include innkeeper-guest, 
possessor of premises open to the public-invitee, common carrier-
passenger, employer-employee, school district-pupil, and hospital-
patient. 
Id. at 307-08. 
152. Hemmings II, 375 Md. at 559, 826 A.2d at 465 (Raker,]., dissenting) (citing 
Bartley v. Sweetser, 890 S.W.2d 250, 251 (Ark. 1994»; ROBERT S. SCHOSHIN-
SKI, AMERICAN LAw OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 4:14 (1980). 
153. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 151, § 4.14 (quoting Kline v. Mass. Ave. Apartment 
Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1970» (alteration in original). See also 
Bartley, 890 S.W.2d at 251. The court stated that: 
Although some jurisdictions have held a landlord, under cer-
tain circumstances, owes a duty to take reasonable steps to protect 
a tenant from foreseeable criminal acts committed by intruders on 
the premises ... the courts have generally found that, as a matter 
of public policy, it was not fair to impose this duty of protection on 
the landlord. 
Id. But see Kline, 439 F.2d at 481 (holding that the landlord owed a duty of 
protection to tenant because landlord was placed on notice of foreseeable 
criminal acts by third parties but took no preventive action). 
154. See Hemmings II, 357 Md. at 559, 826 A.2d at 465 (Raker,]., dissenting). 
155. See discussion supra Part II.A-D. 
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had no duty to protect tenants.156 Historically, the landlord was not 
responsible to his tenants based on the idea that the lease was a con-
veyance of property to the tenant. 157 After the transfer of property 
and rent occurred, "the landlord's obligation during the term was the 
passive one of noninterference with the tenant's use or possession" of 
that leased property. ISS As such, "an obligation to protect the tenant 
from unauthorized acts by third persons was neither warranted nor 
imposed" by the courts. 159 
Abiding by this recognized doctrinal notion, courts were reluctant 
to impose a duty upon landlords. 160 Only within the last thirty years, 
since the controversial decision in Kline,161 have courts acknowledged 
the duty of a landlord to protect tenants from the criminal acts of 
third parties based solely on a negligence theory.162 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland continued to reject the doctrinal 
change until the split decision in Hemmings II in 2003.163 Clearly, in 
Maryland there was "(j] udicial reluctance to tamper with the [prece-
dent established by the] common law concept of the landlord-tenant 
relationship."164 Moreover, evidenced by the split decision, there was 
reluctance by three of the seven judges sitting on the court of appeals 
in deciding Hemmings 11.165 
The judicial reluctance most likely stemmed from fundamental no-
tions of American property law. One such notion is the concept of 
the covenant of quiet enjoyment.166 A lessee has the right to peace-
fully inhabit his or her rented premise without undue interference 
156. See Haines, supra note 30, at 309 (stating that "courts historically have not 




160. [d. at 304 (stating that " [t]hrough the 1960's, the courts generally contin-
ued to stress property law concepts"). 
16l. See Kline, 439 F.2d at 482; see also Haines, supra note 30, at 301 (stating that 
"[a] lthough the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit in Kline attempted to portray its decision as a natural outgrowth of 
precedent and analogy, the opinion actually constituted a significant depar-
ture from established rules"). 
162. See Hemmings II, 375 Md. at 540, 826 A.2d at 453 (stating that the court 
"recognized that general principles of negligence require a landlord to 'ex-
ercise reasonable care for the tenant's safety'" (quoting Scott v. Watson, 
278 Md. 160, 167, 359 A.2d. 548, 553 (1975»; see also Uoe v. Dominion 
Bank of Washington, N.A., 963 F.2d 1552, 1559-60 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Spar v. 
Obwoya, 369 A.2d 173, 179 n.5 (D.C. 1977); Tenney v. At!. Assocs., 594 
N.W.2d 11,17 (Iowa 1999). 
163. See Hemmings II, 375 Md. 522, 826 A.2d 443. 
164. [d. at 559, 826 A.2d at 465 (Raker,j., dissenting) (quoting Kline, 439 F.2d at 
481). 
165. Hemmings II, 375 Md. at 549, 826 A.2d at 459 (Raker, j., dissenting). 
166. See generally RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTI § 16B.03 
(l04th release 2004). 
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from the landlord. 167 This concept is arguably inherent to all tenants: 
the renter pays rent in return for the landlord permitting occupancy. 
For the most part, tenants do not want or need their landlord to be 
a vigilante because they value their right to quiet enjoyment. Most 
individuals rank the right to privacy and property as main facets of the 
American way of life, and tenants are no different. But because te-
nants do not own property, are such rights non-existent? Unequivo-
cally, the answer to this question is no. Tenants seek and are given 
their rights to quiet enjoyment of the leased premises and privacy as-
sociated with their property in a manner consistent with the lease . 
. The courts would never take away rights of tenants because the 
rights are ingrained in our notions of property; on the other hand, 
landlords' duties continue to expand. 168 More is expected of land-
lords, and the judiciary has imposed more responsibility upon 
them.169 Such expansion has undoubtedly changed the nature of a 
landlord. Previously, a landlord's role in the landlord-tenant relation-
ship consisted solely of providing property for tenants to enjoy peace-
fully, privately, and without unwarranted disruption. 170 With the 
holdings in Hemmings II and Matthews, a landlord can no longer al-
low their tenants quiet enjoyment; rather, the landlord must become 
the cliche "big-brother," watching for any sign of harm that may afflict 
the tenant. Not only does this new role usurp American ideals of pri-
vacy and individual responsibility, it overturns traditional common law 
doctrine. 
B. Superseding Cause of Harm Must Be Acknowledged 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland failed to address the issue of cau-
sation, most likely because it is often an insurmountable issue when 
dealing with the criminal acts of third parties.171 The majority's fail-
ure to address causation is evidence of the fundamental weakness in 
holding a landlord liable for the criminal acts of third parties perpe-
trated upon tenants,l72 as "[c]ausation is an essential element of the 
plaintiff's case in an action for negligence."173 Liability cannot be es-
tablished simply on the grounds that "the defendant breached a duty 
167. See id. at § 16B.03(1). 
168. See discussion supra Part II. 
169. See discussion supra Part II. 
170. See Quinn & Phillips, supra note 23, at 227 & n.2. 
171. See Haines, supra note 30, at 309 (stating that an "obstacle to finding land-
lord liability in a tort action has been proof of causation"). 
172. The court of special appeals, however, did address causation in deciding 
Hemmings I, stating that" [f] rom the facts presented, a fact finder would be 
constrained to conclude that there could be no showing that appellees' 
failure to maintain the common areas was the proximate cause of the fatal 
event." Hemmings I, 144 Md. App. 311, 323-24, 797 A.2d 851, 859 (2002). 
173. Choy v. First Columbia Mgmt., Inc., 676 F. Supp. 28, 30 (D. Mass. 1987). 
2004] Don't Buy . . . Rent! 151 
owed to plaintiff."174 Rather, "[t]o recover for her injuries, the plain-
tiff must prove a causal connection between the defendant's negli-
gence and plaintiff's harm.,,175 Specifically, the tenant must prove 
that the landlord's action, or in the case of security, failure to act, was 
the proximate cause of the tenant's i~ury.I76 
Consider the circumstances of Hemmings 11.177 One reason the 
plaintiff provided for the landlord's liability was that there was no ex-
terior lighting in the back of the building. I78 From the fact that there 
was no lighting in the back of the apartment, as opposed to the front, 
it does not follow that the landlord is responsible for a criminal break-
ing into a locked door in the middle of the night. There is no logical 
leap of causation in this circumstance;I79 the causal connection is too 
attenuated. Therefore, even though the court of appeals h~ estab-
lished that a landlord has a duty to protect his tenants from the crimi-
nal acts of others, and that duty would be breached by failing to 
maintain adequate security measures,I80 the issue of causation will al-
ways be virtually impossible to prove when dealing with criminal acts 








Id. (citing Cannon v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 374 N.E.2d 582, 584 (Mass. 
1978». 
See Haines, supra note 30, at 310 (stating that "[t]he problem is whether to 
treat the landlord's conduct as the proximate cause of the tenant's injury, 
or to consider the third party's intervening criminal act as a superseding 
cause, relieving the landlord of liability"). 
See Hemmings II, 375 Md. at 528-31, 826 A.2d at 446-49. 
Id. at 532, 826 A.2d at 449. In Hemmings II, several tenants of the apart-
ment building where Mr. and Mrs. Hemmings lived, 5 Lynfair Court, recal-
led the state of the lighting around their building prior to the incident at 
the Hemmings' apartment. One indicated that there was "not a light fix-
ture against the wall ... outside of [her] apartment" in the rear of 5 Lynfair 
Court. Another who lived immediately below the Hemmings' apartment at 
the time of the incident, described the lighting at the rear of the building 
as follows: "Pitch dark. You can't see anything. Even if I would look 
outside, I couldn't identifY anyone in that area because it is really dark." Id. 
at 529, 826 A.2d at 447. That tenant stated that the front of 5 Lynfair Court 
was well-lit but that the back of the building was not equipped with a work-
ing light and was "too dark." Id. 
Id. at 551, 826 A.2d at 460 (Raker, j., dissenting). Judge Raker's dissenting 
opinion states: 
Id. 
The entire basis of the majority opinion rests upon inadequate 
lighting in the rear of the apartment building. . . . From this duty 
to maintain adequate lighting in the common area, the majority 
makes the unjustified leap in logic that somehow the landlord is 
then responsible for violent criminal activity that occurred within 
the demised premises and not within the common area. 
180. See id. at 546, 826 A.2d at 458. 
181. See Haines, supra note 30, at 309-10. 
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C. The Problem of Foreseeability 
Criminal behavior and criminal activity may be foreseeable by law 
enforcement officers in'some rare instances, but no one has the ca-
pacity to accurately predict when, where, and how a violent criminal 
will act. There would be no crime if that were the case. Furthermore, 
does the absence of security measures outside an apartment make the 
occurrence of criminal activity within the leased premise more proba-
ble? While the majority in Hemmings II asserts that" [k] nowledge is 
essential to establishing a landlord's dUty,"182 the idea that a landlord 
can foresee criminal activity inside an apartment and subsequently act 
to prevent it forces the landlord into a vigilante role. 
The majority in Hemmings II believes that a landlord should realize 
that a lack of security devices or deterrents may enhance the likelihood 
that a tenant will be the victim of a criminal attack.18S Yet the failure 
to maintain lighting, provide security guards, install surveillance cam-
eras, or invest in alarm systems does not necessarily "make a murder 
within the leased premises foreseeable,"184 nor does it reduce the like-
lihood of crime. The court simply assumes that the landlord's failure 
to provide security will certainly lead to crime.185 The majority, how-
ever, lacks any concrete evidence to support the contention that if 
landlords maintain security devices, less crime will occur on the prem-
ises; rather, the majority's reasoning is only based on anecdotal evi-
dence and speculation. 186 
Moreover, if the landlord can foresee criminal activity, is it unrea-
sonable to assume that tenants recognize that there is criminal activity 
within their neighborhood? Tenants do not unknowingly decide to 
live in an area that is high in crime. For example, before Howard 
Hemmings was murdered, there were records of complaints regarding 
182. Hemmings II, 375 Md. at 540, 826 A.2d at 454. 
183. Id. at 541, 826 A.2d at 454. 
184. Id. at 561,826 A.2d at 466 (Raker,]., dissenting). 
185. According to one study, 
'crime prevention today as in the past has a tendency to be driven 
more by rhetoric than reality.' However, effective public policy and 
practice need to be based on scientific evidence. This is an ap-
proach that has garnered much support in medicine and other 
fields dedicated to the betterment of society. This is not, however, 
the practice usually adopted in criminology or criminal justice. An-
ecdotal evidence, program favorites of the month, and political ide-
ology seemingly drive much of the crime policy agenda. As a 
result, we are left with a patchwork of programs that are of un-
known potential in preventing crime. Crime prevention programs 
mayor may not work or worse yet may produce harmful or ia-
trogenic results. 
Brandon C. Welsh & David P. Farrington, Toward an Evidence-Based Approach 
to Preventing Crime, 578 ANNALS AM. ACAD. PoL. & Soc. SCI. 158, 159 (2001) 
(internal citation omitted). 
186. See id. at 159 (discussing the lack of crime prevention policies based on 
scientific-rather than anecdotal-evidence). 
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criminal activity within the apartment complex. 187 Pelham Wood, lo-
cated in Baltimore County, was not a peaceful neighborhood. 188 
Rather, "[t]he Police Department had filed crime reports for twenty 
nine burglaries or attempted burglaries and two armed robberies that 
had occurred at Pelham Wood over the two-year period preceding the 
incident involving [Howard] Hemmings."189 The violent nature of 
this community was arguably known to members of this community 
based on the types of crimes committed. Specifically," [0] ne of the 
alleged armed robberies took place inside an apartment unit; the 
other involved an assailant who, bearing a sub-machine gun, ap-
proached the victim from the woods near an apartment building.,,19o 
Residents notice these types of activities. 
When tenants choose to live in high crime areas, they assume the 
risk that crime will occur.191 Individual tenants are able to make 
choices regarding where they live.192 If a tenant feels unsafe, he or 
she has the ability to relocate, to call the police, to change the locks 
on the doors and subsequently bill the landlord, or take other reme-
dial measures to protect him or herself from crime.193 When a tenant 
has adequate knowledge of criminal activity, as in the case of Howard 
187. Hemmings I, 144 Md. App. at 315, 797 A.2d at 854. The complaints con-
cerned the following: 
robbery, threats at gun point by an estranged husband, a shooting 
incident at the apartment complex; the 'constant stream of ques-
tionable visitors, or the tormenting by wild young children,' vandal-
ism, apartment break-ins, storage break-ins, theft from balconies, 
theft from common areas, robbery outside of a tenant's apartment 
allegedly due to poor lighting, drug use in the common areas, pos-
sible intruders peeping into tenant windows or patio doors, re-
quests for locks on patio screen doors, complaints that young men 
were using the apartment entrance for suspicious activities, com-
plaints about increasing fears due to lack of maintenance and un-
locked doors. 
[d. at 316 n.2, 797 A.2d at 854 n.2. 
188. See Hemmings II, 375 Md. at 530-31, 826 A.2d at 448. 
189. [d. at 530, 826 A.2d at 448. 
190. [d. 
191. Assumption of risk is normally a complete bar to an action for negligence. 
See Brady v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 82 Md. App. 519, 535, 572 A.2d 1115, 
1123 (1990). 
192. See Shelly Ross Saxer, "Am [ My Brother's Keeper?": Requiring Landowner Discl". 
sure of the Presence of Sex Offenders and Other Criminal Activity, 80 NEB. L. REv. 
522, 543 (2001), the author stated that 
[f1ault for injuries suffered from a third party criminal act 
may ... be apportioned between the landowner and the victim in 
situations where the victim fails to take appropriate protective ac-
tion. If the victim fails to use proper door locks, somehow pro-
vokes or initiates the attack, or is aware of the danger or risk and 
does not take appropriate precautions against injury, the victim's 
compensation may be reduced according to such fault. 
193. See id. 
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Hemmings, and takes no steps to remedy the situation or protect him-
self, he too bears the responsibility for his injuries. 194 
D. Duty to Warn Tenants? 
Another issue that arises regarding the foreseeability element195 is 
whether landlords have a duty to warn prospective tenants of the pos-
sibility of crime within the leased premises. The majority in Hem-
mings II fails to acknowledge that their far-reaching decision may 
impose far greater duties on landlords than intended. Specifically, if 
the landlord has knowledge of criminal activity, must the landlord dis-
close information about the criminal tendencies in, on, or about the 
premises?l96 The Court of Appeals of Maryland did not address this 
issue, but it seems likely to arise in the future. 
According to one scholar, the landlord may face liability if he or she 
misrepresents the safety of the premises to a tenant.197 Specifically, "if 
a prospective tenant asks the landlord about the safety of the premises 
or whether the property is subject to criminal activity, the landlord 
must answer truthfully or be subject to liability for misrepresenta-
tion."198 Of course landlords should not misrepresent whether the 
premises are safe; however, if the tenant does not inquire about safety, 
a landlord may be under an obligation to disclose such information or 
be subject to liability. Mter the holdings in Hemmings II and Mat-
thews, if the landlord had knowledge of the potential dangerous situa-
tion and did not act to remedy it, liability follows. Landlords now 
must diligently warn potential tenants of criminal activity. 
Another issue arises if the threat of criminal activity is not an 
outside force, but rather another tenant. Does a landlord have a duty 
to warn other tenants within the building or premises? For example, 
if the landlord knows there is a registered sexual offender residing in 
the building, should the landlord disclose such information in an at-








See discussion supra Part IV.e. 
See Saxer, supra note 191, at 549-50 (discussing this concept in a section 
entitled "Lessor's Duty to Disclose Potential Danger to Prospective Tenants 
During Rental Process for Lease of Premises"). 
Id. at 550. 
Id. See alsoYuzefovsky v. St.John'S Wood Apartments, 540 S.E.2d 134,140-
41 (Va. 2001) (holding that tenant's allegations of misrepresentation re-
garding the security of the premises did not establish one of the narrow 
exceptions to the general rule that a landlord was not required to warn or 
protect tenants from the criminal acts of third parties occurring on the 
landlord's property). 
See Saxer, supra note 191, at 562 (stating that "[iJn jurisdictions where a 
landlord owes a duty to protect tenants against third party criminal acts, a 
landlord may be faced with a decision either to warn tenants about the 
criminal propensities of another tenant, or to evict the potentially offend-
ing tenant in order to avoid harm to others"). 
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legal issues for the landlord, for example, liability for disclosure of 
possible confidential information, liability for invasion of privacy, or 
liability for defamation. 20o Furthermore, the landlord runs the risk of 
tenants vacating the premises. 
With the extended responsibilities that result from the holding in 
Hemmings II, landlords may resort to screening tenants for possible 
criminal tendencies or vulnerability to criminal attacks.201 In order to 
screen out potential criminals, landlords may interview potential te-
nants and reject applicants with criminal records or those who pose a 
risk as "potential criminals."202 Although "[u]sing a criminal record 
to reject a tenant should not [result in] potential liability for the land-
lord,"203 it places the landlord in a position in which he can discrimi-
nate arbitrarily and with discretion "so long as excluding the tenant 
does not violate public policy or civil rights."204 There is no way to 
ensure that landlords are not subconsciously basing their screening 
on criteria that violates public policy or civil rights. 205 For example, 
"[t]he landlord's biases regarding race, age or sex may contribute to 
the selection process."206 As such, the court of appeals has made it 
more likely that landlords will subconsciously discriminate in order to 
make the premises safer in an effort to avoid liability. 
E. Vagueness oj the Security Standard That the Landlord Must Meet 
The Hemmings II majority did not discuss the standard for security 
and protection that the landlord must meet.207 The majority only reit-
erates that the security measures be "reasonable."208 It has been ar-
gued that" [g) ate systems, video cameras, security guards, alarms, and 
other potential mechanisms" may help safeguard tenants from poten-
tial third party criminals.209 Although these are "reasonable mea-
sures,"210 it is unclear whether the landlord is required to maintain all 
of the security mechanisms or only one of them. The standard will 
obviously vary from neighborhood to neighborhood, which will be-
200. See generally id. at 562-63. 
201. "It has also not been established whether a landlord has the duty to screen 
prospective tenants to protect other tenants from criminal behavior or a 
duty to warn other tenants of known criminal propensities of an existing 
tenant." Id. at 523. 
202. Id. at 564. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. at 567. 
205. See Heidi Lee Cain, Comment, Housing OUT Criminals: Finding Housing/or the 
r.x-Offender in the Twenty-First Century, 33 GoLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 131, 155-
56 (2003). 
206. Id. at 156. 
207. See generally Hemmings II, 375 Md. 522, 826 A.2d 443. 
208. Id. at 541, 826 A.2d at 454. 
209. JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERlY LAw § 17.08 (585th publi-
cation 2000). 
210. See Hemmings II, 375 Md. at 541,826 A.2d at 454. 
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come a mere guessing game for landlords regarding which security 
measures he or she is obligated to implement. 
F. Economic Consequences of the Imposition of the Duty 
Tenants expect that landlords have "insurance that will cover most 
injuries that occur on the property."211 Mter the decision in Hem-
mings II, tenants will expect landlords to have insurance covering in-
juries inflicted by third party criminals.212 According to one report, 
the average "settlement[ ] paid by insurance companies on behalf of 
landlords for crimes like rape and assault in the U.S. is more than 
$500,000."213 Additionally, "[t]he average jury award for cases that ac-
tually go to trial is $1.2 million."214 Thus, in order for a landlord to 
maintain insurance that adequately covers the risk of million dollar 
settlements, the cost of that insurance will be redistributed to the te-
nants through increased rent. 215 As a result, affordable living will de-
cline throughout Maryland. Landlords' new roles as insurers of their 
tenants' personal safety will have economic ramifications on those 
who need protection the most, yet cannot afford an increase in rent. 








[W] hile raising rents for improved security may be feasible 
in luxury buildings, it is unrealistic to attempt to require te-
nants in poor, crime-ridden neighborhoods to spend sub-
stantial additional sums in rental payments for the most· 
effective crime deterrents available. Moreover, landlords 
may be unable to raise rents, because of rent controllegisla-
tion. Thus, faced with a severe financial burden due to 
greater security requirements, many landlords of deteriorat-
ing inner city housing, already operating at low profit mar-
gins, may abandon their unprofitable buildings, leading to 
further urban decay and more crime.216 
Anthony A. Babcock, Peterson v. Superior Court: What Happened to the Para-
mount Policy?, 28 PAC. LJ. 373,413 (1997). 
This expectation is based on the rationale expressed in Hemmings II that 
landlords are in a "better position to abate the danger." See Hemmings II, 
375 Md. at 539, 826 A.2d at 453. 
Rental Housing Online, Landlord Liability for Criminal Acts and Activities, at 
http://www.cses.com/manage/liability.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2004). 
Id. 
See Kevin]. O'Donnell, Landlord Liability for Crime to Florida Tenants-The New 
Duty to Protectjrom Foreseeable Attack, 11 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 979,1002 (1983) 
(discussing the economic consequences of landlord liability for third party 
criminal attacks). 
Haines, supra note 30, at 351. 
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Landlords will be at a disincentive to invest in inner-city housing based 
on the fact that criminal activity may be more rampant, placing them 
in a vulnerable position of liability.217 
Additionally, if landlords' cost of insurance increases based on the 
liability landlords face after the decision in Hemmings II, it is likely 
that landlords with few properties will suffer the economic conse-
quences of the decision rather than those landlords who own more 
property. Larger rental companies can afford insurance coverage and 
the added cost of security measures to protect tenants from criminal 
acts. On the other hand, landlords with few properties may not have 
adequate resources to obtain insurance. In recent years, insurance 
policy costs have risen for landlords, while the coverage has de-
creased.218 The landlords with properties in high crime areas may be 
unable to afford or receive adequate insurance coverage.219 
C. Allocation oj the Duty oj Protecting Citizens from Criminal Acts Should 
Remain with the Government, Not the Private Sector 
Judicial decisions "holding a landlord liable for a third party's crimi-
nal actions against tenants, represent a shift of the public policing re-
sponsibility to landlords."220 Such duty can be characterized as "a 
duty of crime prevention."221 Clearly, "establishing the broader prin-
ciple-that a landlord can be responsible for criminal activities on 
leased premises-has opened the door to an extension of the land-
lord's duty far beyond control and maintenance of the physical prem-
ises to direct control of the conduct of others."222 
217. See id. 
218. Ray A. Smith, Apartment Owners Face Growing Liahility: Rise in Potential Dangers 
and Resulting Suits Send Insurance Premiums Higher, WALL ST. j., Apr. 24, 
2002, at B8. Specifically, Smith states that" [p] remiums jumped an average 
60% to 70% in 2001 from a year earlier, and 50% to 100% for policies 
expiring at the end of 2002." Id. (citation omitted). Smith further states: 
In 1999, the cost of liability insurance for an apartment property 
averaged $20 per unit with no deductible required. . .. So a com-
pany with a portfolio of 5,000 units, for example, would pay a pre-
mium of $100,000. Nowadays, that cost averages $45 to $50 per 
unit, and requires a minimum $5,000 deductible. The average de-
ductible is closer to $25,000. That same company would now pay a 
premium of $250,000 or more. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
219. See B.A. Glesner, Landlords as Gops: Tort, Nuisance & Forfeiture Standards Im-
posing Liability on Landlords for Grime on the Premises, 42 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 
679, 791 (1992) (stating that "[b]ecause of the high costs of discharging 
their duty and the numerous possibilities for exposure to other forms of 
liability, landlords are likely to abandon the landlord business rather than 
meet the increased responsibilities"). 
220. Id. at 707. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. at 708. 
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The bottom line question is how can a landlord control the actions 
of others? Regardless of locks, security gates, charlie-bars, or adequate 
lighting, a landlord's duty under Hemmings II extends to control the 
actions of third parties.223 Likely, this control will fall into the hands 
of hired security guards; however, hired security guards are not law 
enforcement officers maintained by the government.224 Despite the 
effectiveness of security measures, public policy dictates that the duty 
to protect from criminal acts of third parties lies with law enforcement 
officers.225 Landlords are not police officers; even if landlords hire 
pseudo-police officers, society has not placed its trust in landlords to 
maintain public safety.226 Public safety and protection from criminals 







See id. at 688. Such "tort actions, alleging landlord liability for the criminal 
actions of third parties, present several inconsistencies beyond the obvious 
challenge to landlord immunity. For example, such causes of action seem 
inconsistent with the common law doctrine that there is no duty to rescue 
or protect another." Id. 
See id. at 785-86. Specifically, the author states that: 
Id. 
The trend of increasing the responsibility of landlords to po-
lice their properties encourages this private approach to crime 
fighting. From 1969 to 1990, the value of private security industries 
rose from about $2.5 million to $18 billion annually, and the num-
ber of employees grew from fewer than 300,000 to nearly two mil-
lion. Currently private security service personnel outnumber 
public law enforcement personnel by more than two to one. De-
spite this growth, private security personnel are virtually unregu-
lated and are generally less trained than their public counterparts. 
There is direct evidence that landlords have responded to 
crime with vigilante-type, private security measures. For example, 
in Brooklyn, private police forces are 'hired by landlords to oust 
drug dealers when the police cannot. ... The company's tools are 
the same ones employed by its adversaries: violence and intimida-
tion.' In one federally subsidized apartment complex, the Federal 
Housing and Urban Development Office authorized rent levels 
high enough to pay $655,200 annually to one such security com-
pany. These security services effectively operate to rid dangerous 
and drug-infested properties of crime. However, the cost of this 
effectiveness is unrestrained power in the hands of private citizens. 
As one guard commented, "IT they spill one pin drop of our blood, 
we spill gallons of theirs. . . . The cops have to play by the rules .... 
But no one knows what we do." 
See id. 
See id. at 791 (stating that "landlords who do undertake these private polic-
ing responsibilities present an undesirable risk of unrestrained 
vigilantism") . 
See id. (stating that "treating landlords as cops is not the answer to crime 
control, but creating incentives for landlords to be responsible property 
investors and managers may be"). 
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v. CONCLUSION 
This comment rejects the notion that landlords should be the ulti-
mate insurance policy for tenants. Although the Hemmings II deci-
sion has established a duty, the criminal acts of third parties are the 
superseding cause of injury, over which the landlord has little or no 
control. If the question reaches a jury, it follows that the issue of cau-
sation will be the most difficult hurdle to overcome. 
Moreover, separate incidences of criminal activity are difficult to 
forecast, notwithstanding a high crime area. If, however, one assumes 
that criminal activity is easy to foresee, it follows that the tenant has 
the responsibility to take action to protect him or herself from crimi-
nal activity. Individual responsibility must not be discarded through 
the imposition of duties, as the court in Hemmings II clearly does. 
The overarching policy considerations weigh heavily in favor of im-
posing no duty on landlords. Specifically, the economic conse-
quences for tenants may affect those tenants who can least afford it. If 
landlords increase rent to cover added insurance costs, the middle-
income tenants will not suffer. Rather, the lower income tenants will 
be displaced. 
Finally, citizens place their trust for protection against crime, not in 
landlords, but in police officers. In allocating a duty upon landlords 
to protect against third party criminals, the court has usurped public 
policy. 
Teresa D. Teare 
